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ABSTRACT: Notable studies have suggested the potentiality of the WWII wartime mobilization as a 
model for climate change adaptation and/or mitigation. The argument being that we need a similar 
rapid and total shift in our industrial social and economic environment to prevent or at least address 
the pending impacts of climate change. This argument and these studies have inspired us to think with 
them on what it means to use the WWII war analogy as a security claim in energy and climate change 
debates. Here, we would like to use this opportunity to draw attention to some of the implicit dangers 
of a call to war in such discussions. Among others we observe, first, the absence of any attention to 
the actual mobilization policies, in terms of garnishing public support. Second, based on the insights 
from Critical Security Studies, we question the historical incongruence of the case study especially by 
comparing the perceived enemy in both cases. Lastly, building on that same security literature, we 
point to some undesirable and perhaps unintended consequences of the use of war analogies in 
climate change debates. 
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Words are not only tools to think with, they are for all practical purposes the content of our thought. 
The vocabulary of any semantic environment defines the reality with which the environment is 
concerned.  
Neil Postman, quoted in Gyi (1984), p. 138 
Introduction 
To arms! The age-old rallying cry is taken up once more these days, now to mobilize planners, 
investors and consumers for climate change mitigation. As but one example, Delina and Diesendorf 
(2013) have written an admirable reflection in this journal on the mobilization policies during World 
War Two (WWII) as a potential policy model for the extent of the action that is required to tackle 
climate change. It is policy model and analogy that is increasingly invoked by a range of civil society 
actors spanning nongovernmental organizations, popular media and climate protestors, but can be 
traced linguistically to Carson’s Silent Spring which ‘coincided with the Cold War years in America and 
w[as] colored by them’ (Glotfelty, 2000, p. 157. See Cohen, 2010, p. 201 for an overview on popular 
media; but also Brown, 2008; Delucchi & Jacobson, 2011; Wihbey, 2008). Indeed, one recent 
contribution to Scientific American intones that ‘America’s next president must declare war on climate 
change in the same way President Franklin Roosevelt fought the Axis powers during World War II’ 
(Bolstad, 2016; referring to McKibben, 2016). 
Instead of analysing these calls themselves, authors and advocates generally build on them (clear 
exceptions are studies like Cohen, 2010; Oreskes, 2010) while offering historical accounts of national 
mobilization practises during WWII as a potential policy model for the action necessary to tackle 
climate change. For example, after discussing the scale and magnitude of the deployment, the finances 
behind the mobilization (the war bonds), the organization and reduction in labour regulations and the 
actual institutional governmental arrangements, Delina and Diesendorf argue that a war-like 
mobilization, while more complex in the case of climate change, might be what is needed to combat 
it. They ease their zeal for this approach slightly by noting that such a mobilization could be costly in 
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terms of sacrificing democratic procedures and probably slowed down by the physical limits behind 
technological innovation and deployment (2013).  
The article by Delina and Diesendorf falls within a longer list of contributions on the policy models 
behind WWII in debates on climate change. Besides the more popular contributions above by climate 
advocates, the most recent academic contribution to our knowledge has been Delina (2016), with 
earlier assessments coming from Bartels (2001) focussing primarily on the historic WWII mobilization 
parallel of Canada, Cohen (2010) looking at the use of the war analogy in the United Kingdom, Oreskes 
(2010) taking a more reflective perspective on the war analogy, and Malm (2015) who discusses the 
analogy from a Marxist perspective. To be clear, we do not reject the important historic insights that 
can be gained from a comparison of mobilization practices during WWII. In fact, one of us (Sovacool, 
2010) even referred to World War I and the nationalization of energy resources, when U.S. President 
Woodrow Wilson created the United States Fuel Administration in 1917 to manually control the 
distribution of oil and coal, as a possible model of “hard” command-and-control models that planners 
may want to consider in forcing consumers off carbon. 
However, what we observe is a shift from the rhetorical use of war (including metaphors like 
‘combat’, etc.) to increase the urgency of climate change as a problem, to the use of WWII as an actual 
policy model to tackle it. While we are highly sympathetic to the first and, as mentioned above, not 
against the latter, we would like to reflect on the utilitarianism behind both of them and use this 
opportunity to draw out two theoretically inspired arguments. First, following the initial remarks by 
Bartels (2001), we would like to draw more attention to the actual mobilization that was going on in 
terms of support for the war, instead of the organisation of the war effort. Second, we would like to 
draw upon the insights from social theory literatures and critical security studies, in particular those 
working on environmental securitization (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998; Chaturvedi & Doyle, 2015; 
De Wilde, 2008; Oels, 2013; Rothe, 2011; Scott, 2012; Trombetta, 2008), to ruminate theoretically on 
what it means to call upon the discourse and logic of war as a means to increase the urgency and 
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legitimization of, in this case, actions against climate change. Primarily because we feel that the WWII 
policy model, in offering a threat analogy as well as a solution, offers an even stronger security claim 
than earlier war metaphors alone.  
In offering these two points, we try to further the debate on what we see as the core problem 
when it comes to climate change action: the public acceptance of climate change as an imminent 
threat. We do this, not from the climate change debates but from a security perspective. Taking Delina 
and Diesendorf’s paper as a starting point, we are aware that we shift the focus away from their 
intended policy model and towards the discourses and assumptions underpinning it (while also 
ignoring later work which dwells more critically on these aspects, see Delina, Diesendorf, & Merson, 
2014). However, we feel that the authors finish at a similar position when they start by discussing the 
threat of climate change and ‘the need to develop contingency plans’ (2013, p. 371), for which they 
reflect back on the WWII mobilization, only to conclude that the biggest counter to such a war-like 
mobilisation is the potential damage to democracy. To us that is simultaneously correct and 
paradoxical. The claim is correct because strong security rhetoric does indeed affect democracy. Yet, 
it is also paradoxical because the whole point of using such a strong security claim (including analyzing 
its potentiality) is to move the debate out of the regular democratic routines and public debates (as 
per Securitization Theory, see Buzan et al., 1998). The instrumental use of security as a discursive 
source of power, in extreme, is precisely intended to justify notions of moving past normal democratic 
procedures into a wartime political economy that allows society to make sacrifices or compromises 
they would not ordinarily make. The relationship between security and regular (democratic) 
procedures is hence central, but also possess a conundrum for scholars because the acceptance of the 
perceived1 threats by its intended audiences is highly context dependent and as such hard to “predict” 
                                                          
1 Starting from Critical Security Studies, in particular Securitization Theory, implies that climate change is taken 
to be a perceived threat as this branch of literature argues that all security claims are future oriented and as 
such always imagined: the moment a security threat comes true it no longer is a security concern but a 
problem to be solved. The latter working from a different social logic – more routine like politics – while the 
security concern itself shifts to a new imaginary: not the question if an event happens, but how long it 
continues, how to find the resources to survive, etc.  
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(Ciuta, 2009; Chester, 2010). With security being a future oriented affair, while adding 6 billion wilful 
variables to the already extremely complex climate change models, it is not only the threat that is 
‘perceived’, but also the public acceptance of the threat. This, we feel, is an essential issue and one 
that merits closer attention.  
 
Mobilizing the troops 
The war analogy extends the war metaphor which is an often used mobilizing claim for an 
increasing range of issues: against diseases and epidemics, drugs, poverty, crime, obesity, corruption 
and old age, to list only a few examples (Chiang & Duann, 2007; Friedman, 2003; Heineman & Heimann, 
2006; Larson, Nerlich, & Wallis, 2005; Meierhenrich, 2006; Vincent, 2007). To be clear, besides the 
distinction that we see between the use of war as a rhetoric metaphor and as an analogical policy 
model, this type of utilization for climate change mitigation also makes it stand out from other 
discussions where war is used in relation to the environment. This includes discussions on the potential 
wars over future scarce natural resources (Klare, 2001), discussions on how war and conflict will result 
from climate change (Hsiang & Burke, 2014), or in relation to discussions on the relationship between 
climate change and military warfare itself (Saritas & Burmaoglu, 2016).  
Describing the “fight” against Climate Change in terms of a war is not an innocent claim, which is 
the point of its use. Deploying it in this manner has at least three political intentions.2 First, as Bartels 
(2001) notes, it, tries to bring across the urgency of a particular situation. In this sense, as Cohen (2010, 
p. 206) thoughtfully suggests, the horrors of WWII are used as a ‘benchmark’ for the urgency of climate 
change. Second, and more perniciously, attached to the claim are implicit calls for actions (explicit in 
the case of the war analogy) that would otherwise not be possible. It frees up resources, does away 
with standard procedures and legitimizes extreme actions. It is here that the war analogy and its policy 
                                                          
2 Turner (2005) also finds three purposes behind the use of war metaphors: justification, persuasion and as a 
heuristic tool that opens up to a reasoning by analogy to uncover novel insights and policy recommendations. 
Delina and Diesendorf’s article falls in the latter category, while ours focusses more on the first two aspects.  
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model come to the fore and show its strength as it both draws on and strengthens the claim. Third, 
between the urgency and the legitimization of their rhetoric lies the hope of garnishing support, of 
enrolling consumers and other members of society into the discourse.  
In this respect, a discussion of the social dynamics of this support is missing in the policy-focused 
work of Delina and Diesendorf, even though the creation of a shared understanding was a core aspect 
of the WWII mobilization policies themselves and there are clear links to the current climate change 
debates. Elsewhere, Bartels mentions the ‘large scale publicity campaigns to “sell” the […] emergency 
measures’ in Canada but does not discuss them in-depth (2001, pp. 229–230). Instead he concludes 
that the support ‘was not surprising in light of the consequences of defeat’ and ‘increased after the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor’ (2001, pp. 230–231, 230). In other words, as we will discuss below, 
the support builds on the imminence and coming about of the threat instead of the work done to 
actually sell the threat to legitimize the particular chosen extraordinary actions. 
For example, even a brief glance at the literature that discusses the mobilization processes during 
WWII details the importance of the movie and music industry, but also the role played by the 
advertisement industry and the Treasury department.  These efforts culminated in the hard work that 
was done to actually “sell” the war to the American public (Jones, 2006; Kimble, 2006; McLaughlin, 
2006; Stole, 2012). Relevant for the climate change campaign is the fact that even the WWII “threat” 
itself was not always sufficient for parties to join the campaign. Stole (2012), for instance, argues that 
the advertisement industry only joined the war effort after it saw a strategic opportunity for itself, as 
it saw an opportunity to counter potential legal restraints hoovering over them after a public discussion 
on the value of advertisement, and its company customers, in terms of increasing brand recognition. 
Another implication is evidenced by Kimble (2006), who describes how the same war message can be 
interpreted differently by the same audience. Kimble shows that whereas most government material 
was seen as propaganda, the war bonds of the Treasury were not. These bonds, however, just as much 
framed the people at home as soldiers taking part in the war, created strong enemy images, and 
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promoted the war as a temporary heroic thing to justify many of the sacrifices made (Kimble, 2006, p. 
98, 130-; McLaughlin, 2006). This applied mobilization literature shows that it makes little sense to 
believe in the magnitude of a threat to convince a wider audience. It also shows that the field is in need 
of more analysis on the actual work done to sell threats, moving beyond purely linguistic and/or speech 




In addition to the problems identified above, we also argue that, for a series of strong analytical 
reasons, the historical parallels between WWII and current climate change mitigation debate do not 
necessarily hold. Put in other terms, the cases are incongruent. 
Continuing with the brief remarks from Bartels above, the mobilization during WWII was possible 
as the threat was seen as both tangible and imminent. Unfortunately, the threat of climate change is 
neither (see also the thought experiment in Delina & Diesendorf, 2013). It is not as causally imminent 
as ‘the immediacy and tangibility of aerial bombardment’ (Cohen, 2010, p. 216), nor would the 
“sacrifices” be short-term as the actions are needed for multiple generations to show effect (De Wilde, 
2008; Oreskes, 2010). This sets it apart from wars, for even though they may take decades, inherent 
to fighting a war is the idea that extraordinary measures and sacrifices at some point do end. Climate 
change, unlike WWII, implicates people’s daily routes and lifestyle choices indefinitely, especially as 
they relate to energy consumption. Thus, instead of enlightened motivation, people may react with 
skepticism, denial, and even moral outrage (Markowitz & Shariff, 2012; Stoknes, 2014). Moreover, a 
major distinction is that many of the incumbent companies accepted strong intervention and 
regulation, and were even willing to promote the war effort themselves. In part because it all played 
out within their fossil fuel and steel driven sociotechnical system (compare Malm, 2015). In contrast, 
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in the case of climate action the incumbents actually have to shift away from fossil fuels towards a 
renewable powered sociotechnical system (Geels, 2010; Sovacool, 2016).  
In addition, equally important is the distinction in the level of public support. During WWII, 
governments led the way. However, in the case of action against climate change, public institutions 
are seen as some of the most incumbent and unbending organizations (Ostrom, 2010). From the 
environmental securitization literature we learn that this means that climate change faces a different 
kind of securitization: not one by public governments to legitimize their actions, but one by private 
parties towards the government to call for a change in priorities (De Wilde, 2008, p. 596). Theoretically, 
the analogy between a mobilization for climate change and the mobilization in WWII does not work as 
the processes are different. In a sense, it would be more fitting to compare the climate debate with 
the run up to WWII when the war became seen as a possibility, lines were drawn and the call to arms 
was initiated. 
Furthermore, WWII is characterized by the construction of an obvious and relatively simple enemy. 
In other words, it fits a true security logic of us-versus-them (Wæver, 1995). In the case of climate 
change, the enemy is more difficult to find. For some the enemy is CO2, GHG, or a broader reading of 
climate change and its effects on human civilization. For others the most obvious enemy is the fossil 
fuel industry or the ‘carbon military-industrial complex’ as Urry (2011) calls it. The enemy could very 
well be capitalism (Harvey, 2003) or government inaction (Victor, 2011). And for some there is no 
enemy, as climate change is something caused by all who eat, fly, drive or use electricity and hence to 
be solved by us all (Swyngedouw, 2010). Interestingly, from an environmental securitization 
perspective we again find a difference. This time between debates that treat climate change as an 
externality, as when discussing ‘climate shocks’ (Methmann & Rothe, 2012), or those which treat 
climate change endogenously as resulting from human activity. The value of this difference is limited 
for while a clear enemy might indeed be absent in the latter case, enemies are created nonetheless. 
As De Wilde argues: ‘Though [environmental security] is not about good versus bad guys (as in the 
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cartoon series Captain Planet) the political debate does ultimately focus on specific groups (humans in 
certain professions and industries) who have to change their behaviour (2008, p. 600).’ This results in 
a different externality, one that shifts the blame and responsibility to the ‘other’. 
Besides its theoretical incompatibility with WWII, there is also the question of desirability. Do we 
even want a mobilization mimicking the one during WWII? Bartels (2001, p. 231), puts forward the 
choice between the potential negativities of international wartime mobilization versus the wartime 
like consequences of climate change itself. In turn, Delina (2016, p. 175) translates the question into a 
choice between a prepared government (which has taken on board some of the mobilization lessons 
of WWII) and an unprepared government when the effects become apparent, just as Delina and 
Diesendorf (2013) highlight potentially negative impacts on democratic government. With the 
question of desirability, the “threat” is no longer climate change (broadly understood) but the 
consequences of a fully successful securitization based on the war analogy and a militarization of our 
response (Deudney, 1990). Put in very simple terms: the cure may be worse than the disease. A 
militarization of climate change action could take multiple shapes. In a worst-case scenario, it makes 
people fallback on their perception of nation-states locked in a perpetual Hobbesian struggle and 
returns us to a state of war perhaps best left behind. Or, in line with De Wilde above, militarization 
could take place on a societal level with conflict and violence between particular groups within society, 
either between have’s or have-not’s or between parties that consider themselves climate friendly and 
others that are deemed climate deniers/polluters (Hayes & Buxton, 2015).  
While there could be physical cases of actual militarization and physical conflict, the impact of 
militarization already starts earlier on a discursive level in the friend/enemy distinction. ‘[P]eople who 
think of themselves as being at war will tend to behave at times as if they were at war. In other words, 
they will become more warlike, and their relationships will become more like war (Turner, 2005, p. 
33).’ Other authors go beyond this and argue that the use of War or other apocalyptic scenarios as a 
mobilizer works counter to its intentions. For instance, Oreskes (2010, p. 223) describes it as an 
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unpleasantness that people try to avoid and which makes them reject the science as well as any 
perceived top-down intervention in their lives. Likewise, Yuen talks about the ‘paralyzing effects of 
fear’ (2012, p. 16; as quoted by Chaturvedi & Doyle, 2015, p. 1). In other words, these authors argue 
that to call upon the threat level of WWII, one of the ultimate securitization claims together with 
apocalypses (Methmann & Rothe, 2012) and nuclear winters (Chaturvedi & Doyle, 2015, p. 15), could 
in fact hinder the very actions that need to be taken by overstating their case or by giving an impression 
of inevitability (cf environmental psychology like Stoknes, 2014; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009).  
From a critical security perspective, those who use a war metaphor replace their political goals 
with a security logic that of itself has no substantive political argument. It is do or die. However, every 
securitization move still takes place in a political arena and needs to be accepted by its intended 
audience (Balzacq, 2005). The simplicity of the choice between accepting the premise or perishing 
therefore has the possible effect of making it harder for people to accept it. In turn, a war analogy 
(which combines the war metaphor as a rhetorical tool and the war as a policy model for its 
extraordinary solutions) is playing on two fields as it advocates the threat to those who do not agree 
with it yet while it opens up and influences the politics of the extraordinary measures to those who 
already agree with it. This layered, complex nature of security is confirmed by the environmental 
securitization literature, which is witness to many localized securitizing moves but cannot confirm the 
acceptance of extraordinary measures by the intended audience and as such the successful 
securitization of climate change (De Wilde, 2008; Oels, 2013; Trombetta, 2008). 
 
Mobilising for Peace 
In the absence of a successful securitization, together with the inherent dangers of militarization, 
overstatement and historical incongruence, we propose to shift the discussion from War to the routine 
politics of security and risk with war’s counter-concept Peace. Discursively, it is impossible to discuss 
the one without referring to the other. Without each other these concepts would in fact lose meaning: 
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for just as ‘war always contains the expectation of peace[,] in peace the echo of war is never absent 
(De Wilde, 2013, p. 34).’ This is evident in climate change debates where the use of the war takes place 
within the politicization of climate risks (Oels, 2013). The many forms of climate activism, for instance, 
are definitely not war oriented. North (2011; also used by Delina et al., 2014) observes that most action 
against climate change currently stems from either ‘outward activists’ or ‘local niche activism’. The 
former he compares to the social organization of the peace movements (p1582), with their long 
marches and small activist outings, to gain media attention and a public ear. The latter North describes 
as local communities finding their own solutions to climate change, not unlike the communes of the 
peace movement. In other words, the climate movement and peace movement are closely related, 
especially as both use security logics to advance their cases.  
While every actor should be allowed to securitize the causes she believes in (cf Turner, 2005, p. 
34; Angus, 2013), the danger of war (or the securitization of climate change) is that it blindsides one 
by rooting for a sole cause. The logic of security does not know compassion, only survival. The above 
shows that this is not as clear-cut. In fact, in this tension between war and peace there will always be 
winners and losers, some intended but many others not. Simultaneously, the use of war without broad 
public acceptance might still entice individuals (e.g. eco-terrorists) to take it “upon themselves”.3 
Moreover, a partly successful mobilization that entices government support but not broad public 
acceptance would push towards a police state. Only full, broadly accepted, securitization would be 
acceptable. This, because the moment it would be accepted it would not be ‘out of the ordinary’ 
anymore: we would find ourselves in a new routine with a politicization of the precise exceptional 
measures that need to be taken. The war would become normal politics again and with the generations 
that these actions take, even the last traces would be displaced as part of a new routine. To paraphrase 
Oreskes: one way or the other ‘climate change would become the new normal. Therefore, whatever 
mechanism is used to address it has to be normal, too (2010, p. 266).’  
                                                          
3 Which, of course, is a controversial security denotation on its own. 
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Conclusions and Policy Insights  
To conclude, we do thank Delina and Diesendorf (and others) for looking at WWII for policy insights 
and attempting to bring an air of urgency and security to the climate change mitigation debate. We 
emphasize with their concerns. We differ, however, with their (rhetorical) tactics. As we have 
explained above, one dangerous element to securitizing our response to climate change, besides 
overstatement, is a militarization of our climate and energy actions and policies. Not just the potential 
that the global system of international relations returns to one of zero-sum interstate competition, but 
also one that discursively constructs self-other distinctions and antagonizes particular groups within 
society. Every security call is based on a process wherein individuals devolve part of their sovereignty 
to a select few who decide what precisely is dangerous, what courses of action are needed and what 
people need to do to be part of the population that is protected. There is hence a constant tension 
between democracy and security (Wainwright & Mann, 2013). 
Furthermore, it needs to be noted that whereas the war metaphor is an example of the use of a 
security argument to move beyond normal political routines, most of the security practices can actually 
be found within these routines. In other words, besides the need to act reflexively when using security 
arguments to advance a particular goal, we call for an awareness to the routines and risk practices that 
already govern our daily interactions (Foucault, 2007; Stripple & Bulkeley, 2013; compare: Cohen, 
2010, p. 216; Oreskes, 2010; Sovacool & Brown, 2015). As part of everyday climate governance, 
security processes can be found in the risk models that are created for climate change estimations and 
the business assessments done by companies, but also in the monitoring programs that try to find and 
identify those who do not play by the rules of the game, be they eco-terrorists, fraudulent energy 
companies, free riders or irrational consumers, policymakers and planners. Security arguments play a 
role when they are called upon to increase the urgency of an issue, but it is when they are accepted or 
enacted that they influence people’s lives. 
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In this respect, we caution that a thoroughly politicized use of security, based on ‘imaginative 
geographies’ of fear (Chaturvedi & Doyle, 2015), has another side that is often left out of academic 
reflections on security practices like these. Namely, the performative realisation that even we 
academics, while trying to remain neutral, still give credence to the War that we evoke.4 Arguing that 
we need a mobilization to counter the threat of climate change is in this sense controversial and 
political because it means that we help push forward one particular vision out from the political into 
the security sphere (Buzan et al., 1998). The fact is that people interpret and frame the threat of 
climate change (and energy technology) differently, even if they agree on the science (North, 2011, p. 
1587; Oels, 2013). From a critical security perspective, this does not mean that people are uninformed, 
irrational, stubborn or stupid; it means that they have other security claims competing with their 
perceived individual or social vulnerability to climate change. Moreover, while a discussion on 
thresholds might not be as attractive as a discussion on catastrophes and the war that needs to be 
fought to prevent them; these nevertheless form the political process that Delina and Diesendorf try 
to protect at the end of their article.  
The question remains therefore: do we really want the current politicization of climate change to 
become a government driven securitization, where ‘there is a danger that the militarist approach to 
deal with environmental issues leads to the militarization of the society’ (Kakonen 1994, 4 as quoted 
in Chaturvedi & Doyle, 2015, p. 132)? Do we really want to go to War? The scholars studying the war 
analogy see merit in the organizational model of the war analogy yet offer several caveats as to its 
translation for climate change mitigation, whereas we caution against the unreflective discursive use 
of the analogy itself. For the words and discourses we use to define climate change as a problem are 
more than what Hajer (1995) calls simple “modes of talking.” Delina and Diesendorf remind us that 
such phrases and rhetorical cues can involve more complex modes of thought and particular ways of 
framing, thinking, and even acting. Despite at times their lack of coherence, such discursive practices 
                                                          
4 With this article, we clearly do so as well.  
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are at their core exclusionary and hegemonic as they only authorize certain people to participate and 
come with discursive forms of internal discipline to maintain order. Discourses such as the 
militarization of climate change are not to be seen merely as mediums through which to gain support 
for a cause. They become part of reality, naturalized and invisible. This is perhaps what makes the call 




Angus, I. (2013). The Myth of “Environmental Catastrophism.” Monthly Review: An Independent 
Socialist Magazine, 65(4), 15–28. 
Balzacq, T. (2005). The three faces of securitization: Political agency, audience and context. European 
Journal of International Relations, 11(2), 171–201. 
Bartels, D. (2001). Wartime mobilization to counter severe global climate change. Human Ecology, 
10, 229–232. 
Bolstad, E. (2016). World War Mentality Needed to Beat Climate Change [Climate Wire]. Retrieved 
from http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/world-war-mentality-needed-to-beat-
climate-change/ 
Brown, L. R. (2008). Plan B 3.0: mobilizing to save civilization (Rev. and expanded). New York, NY: 
Norton. 
Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J. H. (1998). Security: a new framework for analysis. Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Pub. 
Chaturvedi, S., & Doyle, T. (2015). Climate Terror. Palgrave Macmillan. Retrieved from 
http://www.palgraveconnect.com/doifinder/10.1057/9781137318954 
Chester, L. (2010). Conceptualising energy security and making explicit its polysemic nature. Energy 
Policy, 38(2), 887–895. 
Chiang, W.-Y., & Duann, R.-F. (2007). Conceptual metaphors for SARS: “war” between whom? 
Discourse & Society, 18(5), 579–602. http://doi.org/10.1177/0957926507079631 
Ciuta, F. (2009). Security and the problem of context: a hermeneutical critique of securitisation 
theory. Review of International Studies, 35(2), 301–26. 
Cohen, M. J. (2010). Is the UK preparing for “war”? Military metaphors, personal carbon allowances, 
and consumption rationing in historical perspective. Climatic Change, 104(2), 199–222. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-009-9785-x 
16 
De Wilde, J. H. (2008). Environmental Security Deconstructed. In H. G. Brauch, Ú. O. Spring, H. C. 
Mesjasz, J. Grin, P. Dunay, N. C. Behera, … P. H. Liotta (Eds.), Globalization and Environmental 
Challenges (pp. 595–602). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. Retrieved from 
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-75977-5_45 
De Wilde, J. H. (2013). De Verdwenen Vrede [The Lost Peace]. In J. Kustermans & T. Sauer (Eds.), 
Vechten voor Vrede [Fighting for Peace] (pp. 34–46). Leuven: Lannoo Campus. 
Delina, L. L. (2016). Strategies for Rapid Climate Mitigation: Wartime Mobilisation as a Model for 
Action? Routledge. 
Delina, L. L., & Diesendorf, M. (2013). Is wartime mobilisation a suitable policy model for rapid 
national climate mitigation? Energy Policy, 58, 371–380. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.03.036 
Delina, L. L., Diesendorf, M., & Merson, J. (2014). Strengthening the climate action movement: 
strategies from histories. Carbon Management, 5(4), 397–409. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/17583004.2015.1005396 
Delucchi, M. A., & Jacobson, M. Z. (2011). Providing all global energy with wind, water, and solar 
power, Part II: Reliability, system and transmission costs, and policies. Energy Policy, 39(3), 
1170–1190. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.11.045 
Deudney, D. H. (1990). The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security. 
Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 19(3), 461–476. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/03058298900190031001 
Foucault, M. (2007). Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977–1978. (M. 
Senellart, Ed., G. Burchell, Trans.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Friedman, J. M. (2003). A War on Obesity, Not the Obese. Science, 299(5608), 856–858. 
http://doi.org/10.1126/science.1079856 
Geels, F. W. (2010). Ontologies, socio-technical transitions (to sustainability), and the multi-level 
perspective. Research Policy, 39(4), 495–510. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2010.01.022 
17 
Glotfelty, C. (2000). Cold War, silent Spring: The Trope of War in Modern Environmentalism. In C. 
Waddell, And No Birds Sing: Rhetorical Analysis of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (pp. 157–
173). Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. 
Gyi, M. (1984). Semantics of Nuclear Politics. ETC: A Review of General Semantics, 41(2), 135–147. 
Hajer, M. A. (1995). The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy 
Process. Clarendon Press. 
Harvey, D. (2003). The New Imperialism. Oxford University Press. 
Hayes, B., & Buxton, N. (Eds.). (2015). The Secure and the Dispossessed: How the Military and 
Corporations are Shaping a Climate-Changed World. Pluto Press. Retrieved from 
http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/S/bo22669058.html 
Heineman, B. W., & Heimann, F. (2006). The Long War against Corruption. Foreign Affairs, 85(3), 75–
86. http://doi.org/10.2307/20031968 
Hsiang, S. M., & Burke, M. (2014). Climate, conflict, and social stability: what does the evidence say? 
Climatic Change, 123(1), 39–55. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0868-3 
Jones, J. B. (2006). The Songs that Fought the War: Popular Music and the Home Front, 1939-1945. 
UPNE. 
Kimble, J. J. (2006). Mobilizing the Home Front: War Bonds and Domestic Propaganda. Texas A&M 
University Press. 
Klare, M. T. (2001). Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. Henry Holt and Company. 
Larson, B. M. H., Nerlich, B., & Wallis, P. (2005). Metaphors and Biorisks: The War on Infectious 
Diseases and Invasive Species. Science Communication, 26(3), 243–268. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1075547004273019 
Malm, A. (2015). Socialism of barbecue, war communism or geoengineering. Some thoughts on 
choices in a time of emergency. In K. Borgnäs, T. Eskelinen, J. Perkiö, & R. Warlenius (Eds.), 
The Politics of Ecosocialism. Transforming Welfare (pp. 180–194). Balsingstoke: Routledge. 
18 
Markowitz, E. M., & Shariff, A. F. (2012). Climate change and moral judgement. Nature Climate 
Change, 2(4), 243–247. http://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1378 
McKibben, B. (2016, August 15). We Need to Literally Declare War on Climate Change. Retrieved 
August 22, 2016, from https://newrepublic.com/article/135684/declare-war-climate-change-
mobilize-wwii 
McLaughlin, R. (2006). We’ll Always Have the Movies: American Cinema during World War II. 
University Press of Kentucky. 
Meierhenrich, J. (2006). Analogies at War. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 11(1), 1–40. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/kri024 
Methmann, C., & Rothe, D. (2012). Politics for the day after tomorrow: The logic of apocalypse in 
global climate politics. Security Dialogue, 43(4), 323–344. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0967010612450746 
North, P. (2011). The Politics of Climate Activism in the UK: A Social Movement Analysis. Environment 
and Planning A, 43(7), 1581–1598. http://doi.org/10.1068/a43534 
Oels, A. (2013). Rendering climate change governable by risk: From probability to contingency. 
Geoforum, 45, 17–29. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2011.09.007 
O’Neill, S., & Nicholson-Cole, S. (2009). “Fear Won’t Do It” Promoting Positive Engagement With 
Climate Change Through Visual and Iconic Representations. Science Communication, 30(3), 
355–379. http://doi.org/10.1177/1075547008329201 
Oreskes, N. (2010). Metaphors of warfare and the lessons of history: time to revisit a carbon tax? 
Climatic Change, 104(2), 223–230. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-010-9887-5 
Ostrom, E. (2010). Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental 
change. Global Environmental Change, 20(4), 550–557. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.07.004 
19 
Rothe, D. (2011). Managing Climate Risks or Risking a Managerial Climate State, Security and 
Governance in the International Climate Regime. International Relations, 25(3), 330–345. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0047117811415486 
Saritas, O., & Burmaoglu, S. (2016). Future of sustainable military operations under emerging energy 
and security considerations. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 102, 331–343. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2015.08.010 
Scott, S. V. (2012). The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics: How Close have We Come 
and would Full Securitization Enhance the Efficacy of Global Climate Change Policy? Review 
of European Community & International Environmental Law, 21(3), 220–230. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12008 
Sovacool, B. K. (2010). Building Umbrellas or Arks? Three Alternatives to Carbon Credits and Offsets. 
The Electricity Journal, 23(2), 29–40. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2010.02.002 
Sovacool, B. K. (2016). How long will it take? Conceptualizing the temporal dynamics of energy 
transitions. Energy Research & Social Science, 13, 202–215. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2015.12.020 
Sovacool, B. K., & Brown, M. A. (2015). Deconstructing facts and frames in energy research: Maxims 
for evaluating contentious problems. Energy Policy, 86, 36–42. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2015.06.020 
Stoknes, P. E. (2014). Rethinking climate communications and the “psychological climate paradox.” 
Energy Research & Social Science, 1, 161–170. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2014.03.007 
Stole, I. L. (2012). Advertising at War: Business, Consumers, and Government in the 1940s. University 
of Illinois Press. 
Stripple, J., & Bulkeley, H. (Eds.). (2013). Governing the Climate: New Approaches to Rationality, 
Power and Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from 
http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9781107110069 
20 
Swyngedouw, E. (2010). Impossible Sustainability and the Post-political Condition. In M. Cerreta, G. 
Concilio, & V. Monno (Eds.), Making Strategies in Spatial Planning (pp. 185–205). Springer 
Netherlands. 
Trombetta, M. J. (2008). Environmental security and climate change: analysing the discourse. 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21(4), 585–602. 
Turner, D. D. (2005). Are We at War with Nature? Environmental Values, 14(1), 21–36. 
http://doi.org/10.3197/0963271053306122 
Urry, J. (2011). Climate Change and Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Victor, D. G. (2011). Global Warming Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies for Protecting the 
Planet. Cambridge University Press. 
Vincent, J. A. (2007). Science and imagery in the “war on old age.” Ageing & Society, 27(6), 941–961. 
http://doi.org/10.1017/S0144686X07006630 
Wæver, O. (1995). Securitization and desecuritization. In R. D. Lipschutz (Ed.), On Security (pp. 46–
86). New York: Columbia University Press. 
Wainwright, J., & Mann, G. (2013). Climate Leviathan. Antipode, 45(1), 1–22. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2012.01018.x 
Wihbey, J. (2008, July 17). Covering Climate Change as a National Security Issue. Retrieved from 
http://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2008/07/covering-climate-change-as-a-national-
security-issue/ 
Yuen, E. (2012). The Politics of Failure Have Failed: The Environmental Movement and Catastrophism. 
In S. Lilley, D. McNally, E. Yuen, & J. Davis (Eds.), Catastrophism: The Apocalyptic Politics of 
Collapse and Rebirth (pp. 15–43). PM Press. 
 
